Diebold’s screens need closer look
Who’s worried about the potential problems facing Diebold Inc. on Election Day? Not Wall Street. Shares in the dominant maker of touch-screen voting machines are closing in on their 52-week high, and it’s hard to find an analyst who’s bearish….Electronic voting machines represent a growth opportunity. The government, responding to the “hanging chad” debacle of the 2000 election, has spent $3 billion on purchasing electronic equipment. Touch-screen voting will happen in 34 states, about one-third of all precincts nationwide, and Diebold’s AccuVote system leads in market share.
In today’s highly technologically-advanced world, more and more of our lives are going digital. We bank online, we communicate online, we order pizza online. While we may not- yet- be able to vote online, that reality is probably not far off. In the meantime, we have the next “best” thing: electronic touch-screen voting. No muss, no fuss, no paper…and that is exactly what’s wrong with this brave new world.
I don’t know that I can fall into line with those who are convinced that Diebold helped to steal the 2004 Presidential election. Nonetheless, with no paper trail available in areas that use electronic voting, how can we ascertain the integrity of an election? And if we cannot vouch for the integrity of an election, what then? It’s possible, I suppose, that Diebold did in fact rig the 2004 election to ensure that Our Glorious and Benevolent Leader was returned to the White House. Of course, there’s no evidence to support this claim (at least that I’m aware of), but circumstantial evidence and suspicious events certainly raised the specter that something was rotten in Denmark…or in this case Ohio. The problem with electronic voting is that most systems don’t provide a paper trail than can be checked against the results to determine if a problem, or at least irregularities, exist.
The business also has brought unaccustomed criticism to a company that built its reputation protecting bank customers and once hired retired “untouchable” Eliot Ness as its chairman.
The T-man’s distant successor, Walden O’Dell, vowed in 2003 that he was “committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president.” The company distanced itself from the remarks, and O’Dell said he only meant them as a Bush fund-raiser. He later resigned.
Still, the bitterly close 2004 election in Ohio caused mistrust of Diebold to linger, even though most problems concerned long lines and the availability of voting machines. This spring, however, problems with Diebold machines plagued Cleveland.
Now, revelations have emerged that Ken Blackwell, Ohio’s stridently partisan secretary of state, who also was chairman of President Bush’s re-election campaign, owned shares in Diebold. Ohio bought Diebold machines during Blackwell’s tenure. While he has said he didn’t direct his investments, the scandal is one more reason his gubernatorial campaign is sinking. It also underscores an interesting divergence in opinion. If Wall Street’s not worried about Diebold, others are.
Last week, a former Maryland legislator critical of electronic voting received an anonymous package. Inside were disks with key pieces of programming from Diebold software. The FBI is investigating.
That electronic voting machines can be hacked, and elections stolen, has been the key criticism of the new systems.
Paper ballots are hardly a perfect system, as the 2000 clusterf—k in Florida amply demonstrated. Nonetheless, at least paper voting produces a tangible record of a voter’s intent. Can an electronic system ever provide that sort of security? Perhaps in time, but in it’s current iteration, that is simply not a possibility. As a result, we’re left with a system open to the possibility of manipulation by a company on record as promising to deliver votes to Republicans.
Doesn’t exactly inspire confidence, does it?
